ABSTRACT Considering a wireless social network, we investigate a cooperative jamming scheme based on the space power synthesis with unknown channel state information (CSI) of eavesdroppers. In particular, we provide a multiple jammers-based anti-eavesdropping model and formulate it by a superposition principle of various jamming signals in a free space. Based on the model, we analyze the superimposed effects of jammers with different locations in a fixed area, and then present corresponding jamming schemes to minimize synthetic jamming power at a legitimate receiver but satisfying basic interference in other locations. Furthermore, we also provide power allocation schemes to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate of a legitimate receiver. Numerical simulation results demonstrate that the secrecy performance of our cooperative jamming schemes can satisfy the requirements of secure transmission in a fixed area. Besides, our proposed power allocation schemes can further improve secrecy rate without known exact CSI of eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of mobile Internet applications, various kinds of users with different attribute are full of social networks. Apart from data transmission among legitimate users, numerous illegal users hidden in the networks may wiretap privacy of users. This secure issue is traditionally solved by cryptography-based technologies over upper layers [1] , [2] . These encryption methods rely on assumptions that the physical layer can provide a reliable link as well as eavesdroppers cannot crack the secret key [3] , [4] . Yet, it is difficult to ensure a perfect secure transmission due to following reasons. First, the continuous improvement of hardware technologies lead to a rapid growth of computation power, which may enhance the ability to crack. Second, a reliable wireless link is hard to achieve due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium. Thus, this mandates the need of some extra layer of security protection, i.e., physical layer security (PLS).
As a supplemental technology, PLS aims to stop eavesdroppers from correctly receiving any private signal [3] , [5] . Cooperative jamming is one of popular methods to prevent eavesdroppers. To be specific, this method is to select helpers to send artificial noise (AN) so as to degrade quality of received signals of eavesdroppers while not interfere with legitimate receivers [6] . According to the difference of received signals quality, an indicator called as secrecy capacity is introduced to measure the maximum rate difference between legitimate users and eavesdroppers [7] . When the secrecy capacity is positive, private information can be received by legitimate users but not eavesdroppers [8] .
Yet, existing cooperative jamming schemes mainly concentrate on the optimization of secrecy rate for pre-known channel state information (CSI) of all receivers in networks [9] . Nevertheless, it is very difficult to estimate CSI of eavesdroppers perfectly due to errors of channel estimation and quantization. Even worse, we may not obtain any information of eavesdroppers within passive receive mode. Therefore, it is not practical to design jamming-based secure transmission in the assumption of known eavesdroppers' CSI.
Motivated by the aforementioned challenges, we design a novel cooperative jamming method in the case of unknown CSI of eavesdroppers. This method exploits the superposition of various AN (also known as jamming signals) transmitted by different jammers in wireless social networks. Then the synthesis of jamming signals is deliberately designed to null at legitimate receivers while satisfying interference requirements at other locations in a fixed area. In that case, we can achieve secure transmission based on cooperative jamming with unknown CSI of eavesdroppers. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides a pioneering direction that has not yet been studied in cooperative jamming. The main contributions of our work are summarized as below.
• Considering eavesdroppers without known CSI, we propose a novel cooperative jamming strategy based on the space power synthesis, and then formulate a signal power synthetic problem employing the superposition of various jamming signals in wireless social networks.
• Analyzing different transmit parameters of every jammer (including the number of jammers, the initial emission current and phase), we derive a series of solutions for different physical locations of jammers.
• We formulate an achievable secrecy rate optimization problem and transform it into two sub-problems. Then, a heuristic simulated annealing algorithm is presented to approximately optimize two sub-problems. To reduce computational complexity, two search methods are introduced to find a feasible solution for two subproblems. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is summarized in Section II, followed by the network model and the problem formulation in Section III. Considering various locations and different transmitted parameters of jammers, Section IV provides the existence and uniqueness of our solution. Next, we formulate an optimization problem based on proposed jamming nulling solution and then analyze the achievable secrecy rate against the worst-case eavesdropper in Section V. In Section VI, we discuss characteristics of synthetic jamming power in various scenarios, and then analyze the achievable secrecy performance for proposed algorithms. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
According to Wyner's wiretap channel theorem [10] , [11] , secure communication can be guaranteed by PLS when a wiretap channel is a degraded version of the desired legitimate receiver's. Inspired by these seminal works, PLS-based methods were presented based on physical characteristics of wireless channels to achieve wireless secure communications. Among these existing methods, cooperative jamming in wireless secure communication was drawn considerable attention [3] , [12] - [16] .
Negi and Goel first proposed an approach in [17] . They suggested that one or serval friendly nodes could send AN to degrade the channel quality of eavesdroppers while maintaining little interference to legitimate receivers. This approach was often referred to as cooperative jamming in later works [6] , [18] - [20] . Then, Aggarwal et al. [21] studied an orthogonal jamming signal to degrade the eavesdropper's channel quality but not to interfere with legitimate receivers. Applying a beamforming technique into the jamming signal design, Oggier and Hassibi [22] and Dong et al. [23] calculated a perfect secrecy capacity of a multi-antenna model. From the perspective of power allocation, Li et al. [24] maximized the system secrecy capacity subjecting to power constraints. They designed a novel cooperative jamming scheme to encourage helpers via harvested energy in their extended works [25] . Not only the above-mentioned, most existing literatures required perfect CSI of both legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers to compute secrecy capacity based on Shannon Theorem.
Clearly, it is impractical to obtain perfect CSI due to errors of channel estimation and quantization. Thus, Li et al. [26] further introduced a channel uncertainty to optimize worstcase secrecy capacity. Yet, passive eavesdroppers might not be aware of by legitimate users if they did not actively broadcast signals. To tackle this challenge, Vilela et al. [27] investigated secrecy capacity from a more practical point of view. They assess system secure performance by employing statistical CSI including path-loss and fading effects. Moreover, as an extension of [27] , Li et al. [28] also minimized insecure areas based on the statistical CSI.
Nevertheless, studies on cooperative jamming in unknown eavesdroppers' CSI are still cruxes for secure transmission. Different from the aforementioned jamming strategies, we study cooperative jamming based on space power synthesis with unknown CSI in this paper. The previous beamforming-based methods with known CSI, such as zeroforcing technology, can only cancel jamming signals in a certain direction. On the contrary, our goal is to design a jamming-free scheme at legitimate receivers without known CSI. In other words, when employing our scheme, eavesdroppers cannot find any other areas without jamming signals except for the locations of legitimate receivers. To the best of our knowledge, this work provides a pioneering topic that has not been studied in cooperative jamming.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present an anti-eavesdropping model over physical layer of a wireless social network in Fig. 1 . In the model, there exist a transmitter (Tx), a legitimate receiver (Rx), and several eavesdroppers (Eves). Both Tx and Rx may exchange privacy data with each other in the social network with a fixed area. During privacy data sharing, Eves may have opportunities to wiretap privacy data due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. In that case, Tx intends to select friendly jammers (Jms) from a set of candidate helpers (Hes) to cooperatively jam Eves. The selected jammers may broadcast interference signals during privacy data sharing. The jamming signals can degrade the received signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of Eves while do not interfere with the reception of Rx. To achieve cooperative jamming for Eves based on AN, the secrecy capacity for wiretap channels is analyzed in [29] . Yet, this analysis can only implement with known CSI of both users and Eves. In a more general case, it is hard to obtain CSI of Eves in advance. Therefore, without known Eves' CSI in a social network, we intend to design a novel scheme to minimize synthetic power of jamming signals at Rx while ensuring a necessary interference strength in a fixed area.
In our model, we assume that all nodes are equipped with a single antenna and they can communicate with each other over free space. 1 Based on the free space propagation model [30] - [32] , the corresponding synthetic electric field intensity of emitted signals from n jammers to a target in a far electric field is as below,
where f i (θ, φ) = sin θ is defined as the directivity function of the Jm i . The rest symbols are defined in Table 1 .
Without loss of generality, we also assume that all jammer antennas have the same length (L = λ . Considering a twodimensional plane (i.e., θ = π 2 ), (1) can be simplified as 1 In our paper, we only analyze the free space scenario. In future, we will study the power-synthesis-based cooperative jamming for multi-user scenario with shadowing fading and multipath effect. In that scenario, we will analyze the secure performance in terms of amplitude and phase compensation.
below,
where A i
is the amplitude of the ith jamming signal. According to Poynting's theorem and Maxwell's equations in [33] , the synthetic power density P r can be expressed as
where H = E η is the superimposed magnetic field strength. Obviously, P r and the electric field strength |E| 2 have the following proportional relationship,
So far, our anti-eavesdropping model has been formulated. There exist several factors to impact on the synthetic power intensity, including the number of selected jammers n, the current on each jammer's antenna I i , the distance from a jammer to a target r i , and the initial phase ϕ i . Then, we analyze the effect of these factors on P r in detail in next section, so as to minimize it at Rx in a fixed area.
IV. PROPERTIES OF JAMMING NULLING SOLUTION A. THE EXISTENCE OF JAMMING NULLING SOLUTION
In this subsection, we investigate the minimum synthetic jamming power density at Rx. Ideally, we expect the strength of synthetic jamming signal power at Rx to be less than elsewhere in a fixed area. Obviously, this goal is in no condition to be achieved by only one single-antenna jammer. On the further research of the proportional relationship in (4), the lemma for a cooperative jamming system with two friendly jammers can be given as below.
Lemma 1: Taking a system with two cooperative jammers into account, the synthetic power density and the square of superimposed amplitude of two jamming signal have a proportional relationship, i.e.,
is the corresponding phase difference. Proof: According to (2), the synthetic electric field strength of a cooperative jamming system with two friendly jammers can be given by
which can be rewritten as a real part and an imaginary part by the Euler formula, i.e.
where Re(E) = A 1 cos(ωt +βr 1 +ϕ 1 )+A 2 cos(ωt +βr 2 +ϕ 2 ),
With the help of the Rotation Vector algorithm, (6) can be further deduced into the following form, i.e.,
where
) is the superimposed amplitude of two jamming signals, and ϕ = arctan A 1 sin(βr 1 +ϕ 1 )+A 2 sin(βr 2 +ϕ 2 )
A 1 cos(βr 1 +ϕ 1 )+A 2 cos(βr 2 +ϕ 2 ) is the corresponding superimposed phase.
Recalling the proportional relationship between P r and |E| 2 as shown in (4), (5) holds and Lemma 1 is proved. Accordingly, we can conclude existence conditions. When (8) and (9) hold, the synthetic jamming power at Rx can achieve the minimum value (i.e., P r at Rx is zero) in the fixed area,
Amplitude condition:
From above analysis, the existence of fundamental solution has been proved. This solution can be expressed as below,
B. THE UNIQUENESS OF JAMMING NULLING SOLUTION
Apart from the existence of our nulling solution, we still discuss whether there exist other solutions in the fixed area.
In other words, we intend to discuss and prove the uniqueness of our solution in this subsection. According to the existence conditions, we learn that distances between a target with nulling solution and two jammers, r 1 and r 2 , needs to satisfy
Accordingly, we can construct two circles. The centers are Jm1 and Jm2 and the corresponding radius are r i , (i = 1, 2), as shown in Fig. 2 . Then the intersections of two circles are synthetic zero points. Obviously, for each k, two circles may have two intersections, i.e. two zero points. Note that there are two identical intersections if the two circles are tangent.
As a result, we can make the solution unique via adjusting wavelengths (λ) of jammers. For different location relationship between Rx and jammers, we provide corresponding analytic demonstrations as follows.
1) Rx IS COLLINEAR WITH TWO JAMMERS
In this case, we should study two different relative location, i.e., Rx is inside or outside of a line segment of two jammers. Fig. 2 , the two circles may be far away from each other (no intersection) if k decreases (i.e., the radius of each circle is reduced). Besides, there is still no longer intersection between the two circles with the increase of k (e.g., k = k * + 1, φ = (2k * + 3)π), if the difference between r 1 and r 2 satisfies the following relationship,
where r 2 > r 1 , due to d Rx,Jm 2 > d Rx,Jm 1 . In this case, we learn that the difference between two circles' radii is definitely larger than the centre-to-centre distance of these two circles along with the growth of k.
Eventually, (12) can be derived, and Lemma 2 has been proved. Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, when two circles with r 1 and r 2 are internally-tangent at Rx for k = k * , the distance between Rx and two jammers is,
If k increases (i.e., the radius of each circle increases but r 2 grows faster than r 1 ), the big circle with the radius r 2 may VOLUME 5, 2017 contain small circle with the radius r 1 (no intersection). Also, when two circles do not have intersection with the decrease of k (e.g., k = k * − 1 φ = (2k * − 1)π), the sum of r 1 and r 2 should satisfy
In this case, we learn that the sum of two circles' radii is definitely smaller than the centre-to-centre distance of these two circles along with the decrease of k. Then, (13) is derived, and Lemma 3 has been proved.
Thus, the uniqueness of the solution can be guaranteed by adjusting different restrictions on λ in the collinear scenario.
2) Rx IS NOT COLLINEAR WITH TWO JAMMERS
In collinear scenario, the uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed by two jammers as two circles cannot be tangent at Rx. Nevertheless, it can be guaranteed that two circles have only two intersections, as described in the following Lemma 4. (13) . Therefore, λ should be set to the larger one of these two inequalities.
Based on the Lemma 4, we have to select another two jammers which satisfy the condition of (14) and have only two intersection points. To achieve a unique zero point at Rx, the two groups of jammers need to only have a same intersection point at Rx. If this, the uniqueness of the solution can be guaranteed by two groups of jammers (actually four jammers).
3) A SPECIAL CASE
Additionally, there may be a special case where Rx is located on the perpendicular bisector of two jammers, i.e. d Rx,Jm 1 = d Rx,Jm 2 .Thus, the synthetic power at Rx is zero as long as two jammers satisfy (8) and (9) .
However, all points on the perpendicular bisector are zero points. To obtain a solution of unique zero point at Rx, we also consider two groups of the jammers (totally four jammers), which seems to the previous subsection. If so, the unique zero point is the intersection of two perpendicular bisectors of two groups (i.e., Rx is located at the intersection of two perpendicular bisectors of two groups). It is worth noting that the two vertical bisectors cannot be parallel, otherwise we still cannot obtain the unique solution.
4) OTHER CASES
On the basis of above analyses, we know that the uniqueness of the solution can be guaranteed by two jammers (or two groups of jammers). Nevertheless, there are still other cases for the solution of unique zero point. Taking the case of three jammers system as a example, we can also have the unique solution by using the Rotation Vector algorithm. Here, we directly provide the corresponding conclusion for this case as follow,
As a result, the unique zero point can also be guaranteed as long as the parameters of these three jammers satisfy the conditions described above. Similar conclusions can also be derived in other cases, which are omitted here. In addition, the goal of a jamming-free design at a certain point has been achieved through selecting no more than four jammers. Thus, we need not to employ more than four jammers to design the cooperative jamming scheme.
V. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we formulate an optimization problem based on the above jamming nulling solution. This problem aims to analyze the achievable secrecy rate against the worst-case eavesdropper. Here, we define P Tx and P Jm i , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} as transmit power of Tx and the ith cooperative jammer Jm i , respectively. Note that the maximum sum transmit power P max is limited. Thus, the feasible power range of a node is defined as
Based on the Lemma 1, the power constraint is actually the emission current constraint, i.e.,
where I Tx and I Jm i , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} denote the currents on the antenna of Tx and Jm i , and I max is the maximum sum current constraint. As a result, the achievable worst-case secrecy rate optimization problem can be formulated as (17) where JM is a set of candidate cooperative jammers and J is a set of being selected jammers. E denotes an index set of potential eavesdroppers and e represents the index of the worst-case eavesdropper. This optimization problem is nonlinear and difficult to solve directly. Note that once the solution of (18) is obtained, (17) can be solved directly to achieve cooperative jammer selection.
P2
: max 
Yet, (18) is still a non-convex problem. We can separate it into two tractable subproblems and then provide a joint solution, which is discussed below in detail.
A. THE LOWEST SECRECY CAPACITY FOR DETERMINED POWER
We first investigate the secrecy capacity optimization when Rx is inside of a line segment of two jammers. Analyses of other cases is similar. Considering the scenario of known locations of legitimate users, we intend to find the location of the worst eavesdropper in the case of a current allocation scheme.
For this scenario, the secrecy capacity C( 
where (x i , y i ) denotes two-dimensional location coordinates of node i, i ∈ {Tx, Rx, Jm 1 , · · · , Jm n }. Considering a fixed circular area with radius R, the possible area where Eve is located in can be defined as
where d min is the shortest distance that should be kept between an eavesdropper and a legitimate user (i.e., an eavesdropper will not be too close to legitimate users to reduce the risk of being found). Thus, (19) can be transformed as follow,
P4
: min
Clearly, P4 is also a non-convex optimization problem. Although some brute-force search algorithms are applicable, the presence of constraints (20) may cause non-continuity over the solution space. Thus, after reducing the possible solution space, we present a wavy zigzag search scheme to find an optimal solution of P4.
1) A REDUCED SEARCH AREA
Here, we introduce Lemma 5 to reduce the search area for finding the optimal solution.
Lemma 5: The optimal solution (x * Ev , y * Ev ) of (21) is in red area of Fig. 3 Proof: Since locations of legitimate users and transmission power of Tx are fixed, the secrecy rate of (21) is related only to Eve's SINR. In general, Eve may obtain a larger received SINR when it is closer to Tx and farther away from jammers as possible as it can. Considering circles with Tx as a center, point A in Fig. 3 is a intersection of line L Tx,Jm 1 and one circle. It represents the point with least interference caused by Jm 1 . In other words, point A is the worst jamming location for Jm 1 . Similarly, point B is the worst jamming location for Jm 2 . Then, the worst location is on the arc AB for both Jm 1 and Jm 2 . As a result, the search area is composed of all arcs with different radii, as shown in red area of Fig. 3 .
According to Lemma 5, the boundary of the reduced search area is denoted as
which may reduce computational complexity directly.
2) A WAVY ZIGZAG SEARCH METHOD
According to the geometric relationship, the coordinates of point A and point B in Fig. 3 can be calculated as
Obviously, P4 only has one variable y Ev to be optimized for every radius r. Thus, it can be transformed into P5, i.e.,
P5
Next, we present a wavy zigzag search method to find a feasible solution of P5 in the reduced search area in the case of changeable r. This method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1: The worst jamming location is computed by the geometric relationship and the feasible solution (r * , y * Ev ). Solve (25) (r * , y * Ev ) = (r, y Set r = r + r 12: end while 13: return (r * , y * Ev )
Remark 2:
The computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is relate to r. Obviously, the computing complexity grows with the decrease of r, but the accuracy increases. In reality, we can appropriately sacrifice accuracy to improve computational efficiency so as to satisfy limitations of hardware.
B. POWER ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE WORST EAVESDROPPER
In the previous subsection, we have found the worst jamming location with a fixed power allocation scheme. However, we are not sure whether it is still the worst jamming location when power allocation scheme changes. Therefore, we will prove that the worst jamming location does not change along with different power allocation, as described in Lemma 6 in this subsection. Then, we propose a power allocation scheme for the worst eavesdropper as shown in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 6: The worst jamming location does not change with different power allocation when we only consider signalto-interference-ratio (i.e., ignore the WGN σ 2 E ). Proof:
Once the synthetic jamming power is nulled, then the amplitude condition (9) is satisfied. Thus, we have
Substituting (26) 
In general, σ 2 E is fairly low and almost negligible, which may make the secrecy rate monotonically increasing with X . As a result, the worst jamming location does not change with different (I Tx , I Jm 1 , I Jm 2 ).
According to Lemma 6, it is reasonable to consider the worst jamming location computed by Algorithm 1 as the location of the worst-case Eve. Then, we can improve the achievable worst-case secrecy rate by power allocation. In other words, our goal is to analyze the sub-problem of (18) as below,
P6
: max
1) A HEURISTIC SIMULATED ANNEALING ALGORITHM (HSA)
Intuitively, we can exploit a brute-force search over the feasible current region of (I Tx , I Jm 1 , I Jm 2 ) in (16) to solve the non-convex optimization problem [34] . Yet, this method has a very high computational complexity. Here, we introduce a heuristic simulated annealing algorithm (HSA). A brief overview of HSA is described as below.
• Set an initial solution (I 0 Tx , I 0
Jm 2 ) of (16) randomly and compute the result of (28a).
• Randomly generate another solution neighboring with (I 0 Tx , I 0
) and compute the new result of (28a).
• Replace initial solution with new solution if the new result of (28a) is larger. Otherwise, accept the new solution with a certain probability.
• Repeat steps 2 and 3 until find an acceptable solution or the maximum number of iterations is reached.
Specifically, Algorithm 2 summarizes details of our heuristic simulated annealing algorithm. As proved in [35] , the proposed algorithm may converge to (I * Tx , I *
) after a certain number of iterations. The solution obtained by HSA algorithm represents the acceptable suboptimal solution of our optimization problem.
2) A ONE-DIMENSIONAL SEARCH METHOD (1-D SEARCH)
As we know, the main limitation of HSA is computational complexity. Thus, we put forward to a 1-D search method to solve our optimization problem in Lemma 7. 
FIGURE 5. The effect of different λ of jammers on the synthetic jamming power. The simulation parameters are set as follow. Rx, Jm 1 , Jm 2 are located at (0, 450), (0, 150), (0, −50), respectively. Besides,
Proof: According to the amplitude condition (9), we have
Due to the emission current constraint in (16) and monotonically increasing of the secrecy rate, the optimal solution need to satisfy I (29) by employing the 1-D search method.
Note that the above conclusion is presented based on the assumption that the synthetic jamming power is much higher than that of WGN. In this case, the synthetic jamming power should satisfy
Tx,Ev
σ 2 when we assume
Yet, if the synthetic jamming power is very low, we should only ensure the distance condition, d Tx,Rx < d Tx,Ev , to achieve secure transmission.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we provide several numerical simulation to demonstrate that our cooperative jamming strategy can null synthetic jamming power at Rx but not at other locations in a fixed area. Besides, we also investigate the achievable secrecy rate performance of a two-jammers system.
A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SYNTHETIC JAMMING POWER
We assume that legitimate nodes (including Rx and jammers) have fixed locations (different locations for the different scenarios)in a fixed area (2000 × 2000 m 2 ). Yet, eavesdroppers may be distributed randomly in the rest of this area. For different scenarios as described in Section IV, we provide different heat maps which represent synthetic power of every location. Accordingly, the effect of jammers' parameters on synthetic power is illustrated as below, where zero points have been marked by arrows. break 15: end if 16: Set t = ρt. 
For the system with two jammers, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 demonstrate the validity of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 in the case of collinear scenarios, respectively. As we know, the number of zeros may vary with the wavelength λ in these cases. Once Lemma 2 or Lemma 3 holds, there will be only one zero point at Rx.
Yet, it is hard to design a large λ of jamming signals in these two jammers systems. In addition, according to the hypothesis of far-field intensity in our model, all receivers must be located in a far-field area, i.e., r i > d f , where the farfield distance d f can be computed by Fraunhofer area. Due to d f > λ, the large near-field area in the fixed area by the huge λ (e.g λ = 400m in Fig. 4(c) ) may not be able to meet the conclusions of two jammers. Consequently, systems with three or four jammers should be paid more attention. Fig. 6 illustrates a four jammers (two groups of jammers) case, where Rx is not collinear with anyone of the groups of jammers and is not on their perpendicular bisectors. In that case, we can obtain the only zero point at Rx by adjusting parameters of these four jammers. Moreover, similar simulation result as shown in Fig. 7 demonstrates that we can achieve the only zero point at Rx by three jammers.
B. ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVABLE WORST-CASE SECRECY RATE
Considering a two-jammers system, we assume a circular area with a radius of R = 1000 m, and Tx, Rx, Jm 1 , and Jm 2 are located at (0, 0), (100, 0), (100, 150), and (100, −250). Then, we discuss the impact of proposed allocation scheme and Eve's location on the secrecy rate. Note that results are provided by Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 random iterations. Fig. 8 demonstrates the secrecy rate of the worst location for each r in Algorithm 1 for a fixed current allocation scheme. The worst secrecy rate monotonically increases with r. Thus, the worst location is located on the curve with r = d min , as described in Lemma 5. In addition, we find all the worst locations for every r are located on the vicinity of a hyperbola. The hyperbola takes Jm 1 and Jm 2 as focal points, and the points H (x h , y h ) on this hyperbola satisfies
Actually, the above analysis illustrates that ϕ Jm 2 ,Jm 1 = π when Eve is on the hyperbola. Accordingly, we have the following result, i.e.,
Clearly, this indicates that the sets of the worst location of each r is located on the vicinity of a hyperbola. Moreover, for a given current allocation scheme, Fig. 9 shows different optimization results at different Eve's positions. The worst location marked in the figure represents the lowest secrecy rate that the system can achieve in this area after finishing optimization. After finding the worst location of Eve by Algorithm 1, we provide Fig. 10 to analyze the convergence of Algorithm 2 in the case of various maximum transmit currents sum. Due to different current constraints, the numerical results represent a series of upper bounds for the achievable secrecy rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates a novel cooperative jamming scheme for secure communication based on the space power synthesis. Different from existing works, our scheme presents a new feasible idea to achieve cooperative jamming with unknown CSI of Eve. By discussing characteristics of jamming signals, we can null the synthetic jamming power at Rx but not other locations in a fixed area. In this case, we then maximize the worst-case achievable secrecy rate by calculating the worst location and the allocated power between Rx and jammers. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed strategy. YUQIAN TIAN received the B.E. degree from the School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China, in 2015. She is currently pursuing the master's degree from the Shu Hua Wireless Network and Information Perception Center, Beijing Jiaotong University. Her research interests include capacity analysis, spectrum prediction, and resource management in wireless networks.
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